Impartiality as an epistemic privilege

Ithaque 28:1-17 (2021)
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Abstract

In this article, I will examine the phenomenon wherein white people feel that they can be impartial in discussions about racism. Specifically, I will argue that the experience of whiteness confers the belief that one can be impartial, that manifests itself in the appearance of an epistemic privilege. The phenomenological experience of whiteness is constituted in such a way as to ignore the racialized experience. Moreover, white people have privileged access to the majority’s hermeneutic resources, as these reflect and build upon this whiteness. In this regard, I will analyse the white and racialized phenomenological experiences and examine their epistemic consequences to show how impartiality can be conceived as a white epistemic privilege.

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References found in this work

A phenomenology of whiteness.Sara Ahmed - 2007 - Feminist Theory 8 (2):149-168.
White Ignorance.Charles Wright Mills - 2007 - In Shannon Sullivan & Nancy Tuana (eds.), Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance. State Univ of New York Pr. pp. 11-38.
Marginality and Epistemic Privilege.Bat-Ami Bar On - 1992 - In Linda Alcoff & Elizabeth Potter (eds.), Feminist Epistemologies. New York: Routledge. pp. 83--100.

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