Abstract

In this dissertation I examine the use of the idea of the separateness of persons in recent moral and political philosophy. I take the idea of the separateness of persons to mean the ontological claim that we are numerically different persons and subjects. I argue that it is our belief that we are different persons which explains our concern for morality and justice. Though the idea of the separateness of persons is fundamental to moral philosophy, it is not very important in moral theory to find out the metaphysical nature of this separateness. This is why it is not important in moral and political philosophy to discuss metaphysical issues such as the ontological status of social entities and the nature of personal identity, which presumably have important effects on our view regarding the metaphysical nature of the separateness of persons. ;The idea of the separateness of persons, though fundamental to moral philosophy, is not useful in helping us choose the correct moral theory. It is not powerful enough to undermine utilitarian considerations or to support deontological requirements or moral rights in questions about distributive justice and moral responsibility. This dissertation provides an account of how the idea of the separateness of persons has been misused by many writers on the subject--writers such as Parfit, Nozick, and Taurek