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A non-minimal but very weak axiomatization of common belief
Artificial Intelligence 70 (1-2):363-374 (1994)
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Citations of this work
Strong Completeness Theorems for Weak Logics of Common Belief.Lismont Luc & Mongin Philippe - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (2):115-137.
Intension, extension, and the model of belief and knowledge in economics.Ivan Moscati - 2012 - Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 5 (2):1.
Non-normal modalities in variants of linear logic.D. Porello & N. Troquard - 2015 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 25 (3):229-255.
References found in this work
Belief, awareness, and limited reasoning.Ronald Fagin & Joseph Y. Halpern - 1987 - Artificial Intelligence 34 (1):39-76.
Impossible possible worlds vindicated.Jaakko Hintikka - 1975 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 4 (4):475 - 484.
A guide to completeness and complexity for modal logics of knowledge and belief.Joseph Y. Halpern & Yoram Moses - 1992 - Artificial Intelligence 54 (3):319-379.
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