Is “Being Human” a Moral Concept?

Philosophy and Public Policy Quarterly 30 (3/4):16-20 (2010)
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Abstract

Many philosophers have argued against “speciesism”—an attitude of bias toward the interests of members of one’s own species. In reply, Douglas MacLean defends a speciesist or humanist outlook on morality, exploring the ways in which ethics is inextricably tied to practices that define what it is to live a distinctively human life

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Douglas MacLean
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

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The Core Argument for Veganism.Stijn Bruers - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (2):271-290.

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