Abstract

The purpose of my doctorate has been to explore the moral foundations of rules of war by addressing the question of how war ought to be conducted if it is conducted at all. The first chapter introduces the problem, explains the rules which will be of concern , and attempts to show why moral rules and military necessity are not incompatible. Reasons for preferring a natural law opposed to a contract model for understanding the rules are given. ;The second chapter examines the basis of absolutist and consequentialist interpretations of the rules of war in the natural law. The requirements reason makes of moral rules and men's attitude toward them, and four types of moral rules bearing on the conduct of war, basic rules, intermediate principles, practice defining rules, and first principles are discussed. ;Chapters three and four deal with absolutist and consequentialst interpretations of the rules of war, their differences, and criticisms of them. An alternative hybrid interpretation of the rules of war is proposed. The hybrid is not unlike that designed by Sammuel Scheffler in The Rejection of Consequentialism. However, it is able to accommodate absolutist intuitions in a way Scheffler's hybrid does not, by using arguments drawn from Alan Gewirth's principle of generic consistency . It also defines certain restrictions on consequentialist calculations about consequences more strictly. ;The final chapter considers the practical difference this compromise strategy makes. Examples where a hybrid would have been helpful in marshalling support for the rules of war and distinguishing between moral disagreements about how the rules should be applied and clearly wrong actions conclude the investigation