Abstract

The first pathway toward a new conceptualist answer to the existence of universals begins with Descartes. The article is guided by a Cartesian method of starting anew in metaphysics and our knowledge of mind-dependent universals. Relevant examples and learning experiments defend and validate the pragmatic utility of conceptualism. It is past time for analytic ontology to set aside its assumptions, reevaluate its methodology and simplify itself. I raise novel objections through metaphor and analogy against standard and Platonic realism. Independent universals of realism are speculative and are neither necessary nor sufficient. This rejection of metaphysical realism defends the validity of scientific empiricist realism. Historical arguments such as William James’ empirical conceptualism and J.S. Mill’s criticisms strengthen this position. Nominalist methods are also considered. My theory is confirmed and useful for a preliminary epistemic-ontology which evaluates concepts and universals of mineral species. This appendix is consistent with Descartes’ theory of attributes and provides a new important approach to this field of study. The article, long dormant, is made possible by the work of Rene Descartes.