Virtue in a Federal Republic: A Contribution to Political Philosophy by James Madison
Dissertation, Duke University (
1991)
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Abstract
The problematic of this thesis is generated by a contention common among analysts of American federalism under the Constitution that political virtue ceased to play an essential role in American political theory after 1787. This work will attempt to show that such analysis misses central claims made by James Madison, generally considered the primary theorist of the federal system. After an examination of the current interpretations of the political thought of America's founding era, the work of John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, and Alexander Hamilton will be viewed in terms of their respective claims about virtue and politics. This will lead to a close reading of the arguments of James Madison where he presents reasons for believing that virtue is essential to the federal system. My conclusion will be that contemporary interpretations of Madison's federalism have focused solely on Madison's introduction of additional safeguards into the design of the federal system to augment virtue's role of preventing abuses of power and mistaken this preventative structure for the entire workings of federalism