Wittgenstein y Fodor sobre el lenguaje privado

Anuario Filosófico:357-376 (1995)
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Abstract

Whereas Wittgenstein rejected the existence of any private language, Fodor defends the existence of the language of thought, which is private in the sense of inner. A comparison is developed between Wittgenstein's and Fodor's ideas about this issue. Likewise a survey of Fodor's language of thought is made pointing out some shortcomings.

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Pascual Martinez-Freire
University of Málaga

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