Abstract

Ayer argues that without assuming the criterion of verification Wittgenstein cannot prove that private language is impossible. Hintikka thinks that the aim of the private language argument is not to deny the existence of Cartesian private objects. Kripke asserts that what Wittgenstein really does in the private language argument is to show that private model of rule following, not private language, is impossible. According to Kripke, Wittgenstein has found the "most radical skepticism" in the history of philosophy, i.e., 'rule following skepticism.' ;These are mistaken interpretations of Wittgenstein's private language argument. Wittgenstein does not use the criterion of verification to prove that private language is impossible. Wittgenstein would not say that there are private objects in the full-fledged Cartesian sense. Wittgenstein would not accept any kind of skepticism, including Kripke's rule following skepticism. ;There must be some elements in Wittgenstein's philosophy that lead these philosophers to propose such incorrect interpretations. In my dissertation I attempt to identify such elements and remove the temptations that make philosophers misunderstand Wittgenstein's private language argument. Removing such temptations will open up a road for a correct understanding of Wittgenstein