Abstract

Stephen White (1989) suggests that current reductionist orthodoxy has been too restricted in its concern with psychological facts only. But once we widen the range of facts that we allow, including, for example, certain cultural or technological facts (the metapsychological facts), the boundaries we draw around persons will be determined by factors that cannot be fixed absolutely. Whether one survives or not won’t be a matter merely of psychological continuity between one’s different person-stages; inter alia, it will be a matter of what one’s society presupposes about such things as “personal identity, responsibility, and the unity and character of the self”. Such presuppositions differ across cultures and times. So, according to White, there are no universal facts about personal identity and survival; personal identity is a relative notion. In this paper I offer an alternative, and in so doing draw out some important morals for the methodology we apply in investigating questions of personal identity.