Against etiological function accounts of interests

Synthese 198 (4):3499-3517 (2019)
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Abstract

The etiological account of function defines a part’s/trait’s function as whatever that part/trait does and was selected for doing. Some philosophers have tried to employ this as an account of biological interests, claiming that to benefit an organism is to promote its etiological functioning and to harm it is to inhibit such functioning. I argue that etiological functioning is not a good account of biological interests. I first describe the history of theories of biological interests, explaining the special role that etiological accounts of function have played within such theories. Second, I explain the problems with allowing etiological accounts of function to play this role and consider objections to my line of argument. Finally, I consider the theoretical alternatives to etiological function accounts of interests and assess their advantages and disadvantages.

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Katie McShane
Colorado State University

References found in this work

On Virtue Ethics.Rosalind Hursthouse - 1999 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Political Liberalism.J. Rawls - 1995 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 57 (3):596-598.
The Case for Animal Rights.Tom Regan - 2004 - Univ of California Press.
Functional analysis.Robert E. Cummins - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (November):741-64.
Natural goodness.Philippa Foot - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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