Surviving Eliminativism

In Objects and Persons. New York: Oxford University Press (2001)
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Abstract

I argue that we human organisms—though composite—are not mere overdeterminers. We cause, by way of having conscious mental properties, some effects that our constituent atoms do not cause. Because mental causation makes us causally non‐redundant, we are not eliminated by the overdetermination argument of Ch. 3.

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