The Anticipation of the Present: Phenomenology of déjà vu

Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 49 (2):156-170 (2018)
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Abstract

This paper analyses the déjà-vu experience in order to deepen the understanding of the complex nature of time-consciousness from a phenomenological point of view. The paper is divided into two sections: the first section focuses on Bergson’s research on déjà vu in order to assess the validity of his position; the second section describes a specific form of déjà-vu experience from a phenomenological perspective. This investigation will question the widespread assumption according to which déjà vu should be conceived as a disturbance of the memory of the past. On the contrary, the author shows that the disturbance primarily pertains to the dimension of the future. In order to understand this phenomenon, it is necessary to focus on the coherent deformation of the immediate expectation of the imminent future.

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References found in this work

Zur Psychopathologie des Alltagslebens.Sigmund Freud - 1925 - Annalen der Philosophie Und Philosophischen Kritik 5 (3):93-94.
Le souvenir du présent et la fausse reconnaissance.H. Bergson - 1908 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 66:561 - 593.
Des paramnésies.André Lalande - 1893 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 36:485 - 497.

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