Abstract

The common tendency to characterize Hume’s philosophy as simply “skeptical,” “naturalist,” “empiricist,” or “irreligious” is a mistake. Rather, his philosophy is best seen as responding to a number of specific issues that captured his attention in the 1730s, mostly involving causation and thus explaining his particular enthusiasm for applying the Copy Principle to that idea. Other enthusiasms that shaped Book 1 of the Treatise later faded, but the “Chief Argument” around causation—and causal/inductive inference—remains the consistent core of Hume’s theoretical philosophy through theand the many editions of the first Enquiry. In the Enquiry, moreover, Hume manages to tame the corrosive skepticism of the Treatise, enabling him to pursue his ambitions towards a naturalistic “science of man” while maintaining a discriminating skepticism towards aprioristic metaphysics and religion.