Truthmaking, Satisfaction and the Force-Content Distinction

In Gabriele Mras & Michael Schmitz (eds.), Force, Content and the Unity of the Proposition. New York: Routledge (2021)
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Abstract

This paper presents a novel perspective on the force-content distinction making use of truthmaker semantics and an ontology of attitudinal objects, things that are neither acts (or states) nor propositions. It gives a novel norm-based definition of the notion of direction of fit, strictly linking truth and (non-action-guiding) correctness.

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Friederike Moltmann
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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References found in this work

Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Inquiry.Robert Stalnaker - 1984 - Cambridge University Press.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.
Propositional Content.Peter Hanks - 2015 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
Intentionality.J. Searle - 1983 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 49 (3):530-531.

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