Diaphonic pluralism: from truth pluralism to disagreement pluralism

Synthese 200 (5):1-28 (2022)
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Abstract

In this paper, I offer a pluralistic framework for disagreement and I develop a strategy to account for the varieties of disagreement on the basis of the varieties of the truth across different domains of discourse. Truth-pluralism is thus sufficient for delivering pluralism about disagreement—that is, diaphonic pluralism.

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Sebastiano Moruzzi
University of Bologna

References found in this work

Truth and objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Relativism and Monadic Truth.Herman Cappelen & John Hawthorne - 2009 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK. Edited by John Hawthorne.
Vagueness, truth and logic.Kit Fine - 1975 - Synthese 30 (3-4):265-300.
Concepts.Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence - 2023 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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