Abstract

According to Ganguly, the main thesis of the Tractatus is that description is the true function of language. Language describes reality and this is all it can do; and whenever we try to make language do anything else, the result will be nonsense. This explains, for example, Wittgenstein's contention that the general form of all propositions is: 'This is how things stand'. Thus, the general form of all propositions is nothing but the general form of all descriptions. And anything which is not of this form--all normative assertions --is nonsense. In the course of his book Ganguly manages to discuss most of the central issues which concern Tractatus enthusiasts. Some of the main points: In his characterization of elementary propositions he agrees in the main with Anscombe, often quoting her directly. He disagrees with Copi as to the nature of objects. Objects, on his account, are neither 'bare particulars' nor 'absolutely bare particulars', rather they are 'qualified particulars'. Vis-à-vis this position, he makes the unusual claim that an object's internal properties are not to be identified with its form but with its content. Ganguly is at his best in a discussion of general propositions in which he compares W's views with Russell's and Ramsey's. Ganguly is indefatigable in his attempt to make the Tractatus consistent at precisely those points where other commentators have admitted inconsistencies.--M. M.