Le caractère personnel des émotions

Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141 (2):197-214 (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Cet article explore la viabilité de la conjonction de trois thèses : (1) qu’il existe des valeurs objectives ; (2) que certaines émotions ont pour fonction de les représenter ; (3) que de telles émotions représentent ces valeurs de manière fiable. Nous cherchons plus particulièrement à réconcilier la troisième thèse avec l’observation que les émotions ont un aspect subjectif ou personnel qu’il n’est pas possible d’éliminer. This article explores the viability of the conjunction of three claims: (1) that there are objective values; (2) that some emotions have the function of representing them; (3) that such emotions represent these values reliably. In particular, we will be concerned with the project of reconciling (3) with the simple observation that emotions have a subjective or personal aspect that cannot be ignored.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,010

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-04-27

Downloads
48 (#458,768)

6 months
8 (#587,211)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Hichem Naar
University of Duisburg-Essen

Citations of this work

Emotion: More like Action than Perception.Hichem Naar - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (6):2715-2744.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references