Abstract

This paper aims to analyse Husserl’s texts in order to evaluate his attempt to apply a model of intentionality as interpretation(Auffassung) of a content (Inhalt) he had earlier developed to explain a notion of timeconsciousness. In Husserl’s previous published work the Logical Investigations (1900‐01), he construed perceptual intentionality on the model of apprehending intention and apprehended sensual contents for an ordinary object. For later published work, the so‐called early lectures on The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness (1928), he continued to apply the model to analyse temporal objects both in the awareness of duration and in the temporal flow. Brough presented that Husserl’s attempt to apply the model culminated in its rejection. The paper postulates that Husserl did not fail, but in fact was a success. Husserl succeeded in applying the model as a foundation method for investigating the occurrence of remembrance of elapsed temporal objects. In the end he found a suitable way to determine what is actually temporal now, before and after in the continuous stream of time‐consciousness. Without interpretation of a content model, the Husserlian phenomenology that everyone is conscious of the same thing, appearing as such, at the same time, cannot be possible.