Practical realism is focused on the problem of how science really works. In the case of physics and chemistry, experiment is the centrepiece of scientific practice. The rapid development of contemporary natural science does not leave the experiment unaffected. The classical experiment is normally applied only to systems that can be considered structurally stable, repeatability being the key feature. After the introduction of the theoretical basis of irreversibility by Ilya Prigogine the essence of the experiment changed. The strict requirement of (...) repeatability has to be dropped. It will be discussed, whether the change is big enough for calling it revolutionary. There are means to update the understanding of the experiment by applying the experimental settings. The material experiment will probably be with us forever but its position on the scientific landscape will be shifted. (shrink)

This is an attempt to take a look at chemistry from the point of view of practical realism. Besides its social–historical and normative aspects, the latter involves a direct reference to experimental research. According to Edward Caldin chemistry depends on our being able to isolate pure substances with reproducible properties. Thus, the very basis of chemistry is practical. Even the laws of chemistry are not stable but are subject to correction. At the same time, these statements do not necessarily make (...) Edward Caldin a predecessor of practical realism. The latter has other predecessors, like Rom Harré’s policy realism or Sami Pihlström’s pragmatic realism. Chemistry is an experimental science. The experiment is a purposeful and critically theory-guided constructive, manipulative, material interference with nature according to Rein Vihalemm, the founder of practical realism. Chemistry is physics-like science but just partly so. This is an important point in the context of the current paper. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence is developing rapidly. There are technologies available that fulfil several tasks better than humans can and even behave like humans to some extent. Thus, the situation prompts the question whether AI should be granted legal person- and/or agenthood? There have been similar situations in history where the legal status of slaves or indigenous peoples was discussed. Still, in those historical questions, the subjects under study were always natural persons, i.e., they were living beings belonging to the species Homo (...) sapiens. We analyse the situation from moral-ethical and practical perspectives. The final conclusion is that the currently existing AIs are still so far removed from humans that there is simply no need to think seriously about legal person- or agenthood. Doing so would mean imposing obligations on the AI to follow. This, in turn, would mean that certain rights in relation to those obligations would have to be granted as well. By all evidence, this is something that humans are not ready to do yet and might never get that far. (shrink)

The paper deals with the philosophy of science and technology from a new perspective. The analysis connects closely to the novel approach to scientific research called practical realism of the late Estonian philosopher of science and chemistry Rein Vihalemm. From his perspective, science is not only theoretical but even more clearly a practical activity. This kind of practice-based approach puts chemistry rather than physics into the position of the most typical science as chemistry has a dual character resting on both (...) constructive-hypothetico-deductive and classifying-historico-descriptive types of cognition. Chemists deal with finding out the laws of nature just like the physicists do. However, in addition to this chemistry deals with substances or stuff that is rather an activity typical to natural history. The analysis of the dual character of chemistry brings forward the need to analyse philosophically also the reasons why physics has held the position of the model science so far. The problem unfolds in the context of practical realism. However, some earlier observations concerning the dual character of chemistry influenced us as well, i.e. by Friedrich Paneth, Michael Polanyi and Edward Caldin. More recently, Bernadette Bensaude-Vincent and Jonathan Simon have given their own explanation of why and how chemistry has a dual character. From their perspective, chemistry is a perfect technical science as it aims at applications, literally at producing something new. Bensaude-Vincent and Simon call their approach operational realism. The latter, however, does not differ from practical realism. (shrink)

This paper presents a survey of the philosophy of science in Estonia. Topics covered include the historical background (science at the 17th century Academia Gustaviana, in the 19th century, during the Soviet period) and an overview of the current situation and main areas of research (the problem of demarcation, a critique of the traditional understandings of science, φ-science, classical and non-classical science, the philosophy of chemistry, the problem of induction, the sociology of scientific knowledge, semiotics as a methodology).

The purpose of the article is to identify the forms of being of science in the philosophy of the Muslim thinker Abū Naṣr Muhammad al-Fārābī, who lived in the 9th–10th centuries. In this regard, the article first addresses the problem of the origin of science. The enumeration of sciences is manifested in al-Farabi’s research as “divine science,” that is, metaphysics and individual sciences, with a Muslim specificity. Science as a process of cognition is an ascent from the imperfect to the (...) perfect. The First Cause (the First Being) of everything is the absolute perfection. It is also a deity and the “cause” of the origin of sciences. The comprehensive encyclopedism of al-Farabi’s predetermined science is a kind of worldview. In this context, he distinguished between the science of language, logic, mathematics, physics, metaphysics, and civil science, which explains the essence of real happiness. Only members of the ideal community (“the inhabitants of a virtuous city”) are able to achieve happiness. Therefore, the study of sciences in totality creates the respective “virtuous” worldview. (shrink)

For decades, the British philosopher of science Nicholas Maxwell has been promoting a new approach to science called aim-oriented empiricism. Maxwell's basic claim is that the regular way of doing science, called standard empiricism, is untenable because it does not account for the basic general assumptions that scientists actually adhere to without acknowledgment. Standard empiricism is unable to make sense of the progress of science as it is happening. The alternative approach that Maxwell advocates, aim-oriented empiricism, acknowledges some basic metaphysical (...) assumptions, comprehensibility, unity and simplicity as inherent parts of science itself. By including these metaphysical assumptions into science, Maxwell is looking for ways to make sense of the progress of science from a philosophical perspective. This paper challenges Maxwell's claim with the help of another new approach to science, practical realism. While the founder of practical realism, Rein Vihalemm, claims that his approach is closely related to Maxwell's views, he does not acknowledge any need for metaphysics in science. (shrink)

This is an attempt to take a look at chemistry from the point of view of practical realism. Besides its social–historical and normative aspects, the latter involves a direct reference to experimental research. According to Edward Caldin chemistry depends on our being able to isolate pure substances with reproducible properties. Thus, the very basis of chemistry is practical. Even the laws of chemistry are not stable but are subject to correction. At the same time, these statements do not necessarily make (...) Edward Caldin a predecessor of practical realism. The latter has other predecessors, like Rom Harré’s policy realism or Sami Pihlström’s pragmatic realism. Chemistry is an experimental science. The experiment is a purposeful and critically theory-guided constructive, manipulative, material interference with nature according to Rein Vihalemm, the founder of practical realism. Chemistry is physics-like science but just partly so. This is an important point in the context of the current paper. (shrink)

Edmund Husserl believed that he had a method in phenomenology, which could be systematically applied. The essence of the method concerned the so-called “bracketing” of the objects outside of our consciousness. Husserl elaborated his idea through the conception of reductions, which he divided into eidetic,transcendental and phenomenological ones. The conception has recently been carefully analyzed by Dagfinn Føllesdal, an outstanding analytical thinker. But he had do admit that Husserl was not consistent in applying his method. Definitely, the core of Husserl’s (...) phenomenology can be studied using the analytic method. However, this does not mean that we can speak about applying a method in the case of Husserl himself. We get somewhat closer to a clearly defined method when we apply the priority argument of Merleau-Ponty for making the method of a phenomenological thinker intelligible. This helps us to clarify that what is being bracketed in phenomenology is the idea of the world embraced by traditional philosophical theory. What we are left with after the reduction is a reformedunderstanding. (shrink)

Rein Vihalemm's philosophy of science left two prominent philosophical legacies: a methodological distinction of scientific disciplines and the practical realist philosophy of science. The diverse perspectives in this book explore some of the ideas that have sprung from Vihalemm's philosophy of science, and the applications of these approaches.

It is always a pleasure to announce the publication of a new issue of Acta Baltica Historiae et Philosophiae Scientiarum. We have reasons to believe that we have successfully started conquering the new challenges mentioned in the editorial of the last issue. The achievements we are building on have become more solid than ever before. The journal has acquired a truly global reach.

Georges Frédéric Parrot, the first Rector of the University of Tartu after it was reopened in 1802, was a son of the French Enlightenment. He considered it his mission to implement these ideas in the context of the new university. One of the foci of his activities was arranging the university according to a new type of statutes endorsing free development of all kinds of branches of science in the framework of the so-called ‘Academic Republic’, which would be no longer (...) dominated by theology. Parrot was successful in his pursuits. The University of Tartu became an outstanding centre of astronomy, mathematics and natural science—the fields Parrot himself was actively involved in. Today, the term Academic Republic is becoming more and more frequently used by the university employees again. The emphasis on the role of natural science, which was one of Parrot’s main ideas, caused the need for a New Enlightenment. This is the term invented by Nicholas Maxwell, the British philosopher of science. Although the focus of Maxwell’s New Enlightenment seems to be much narrower than that of the classical one, the final goal is still the same. According to Maxwell, making physics the science proper, the basis of constructing serious academic knowledge, has caused the concentration of research on the quest for some kind of special knowledge, the scientific one. Everything stops there. We have lost sight of the general goal of serving humanity, looking for solutions to actual grave problems that Homo sapiens is facing today. Obviously, to serve the whole humanity was the basic goal of the “original” Enlightenment as well. We have to restore the view of the so-called philosophes concerning the position of social science in the academia. It is social science that form the basis for the understanding and solving the problems that are of real importance to human life. (shrink)

The focus of the paper is on Rein Vihalemm’s novel approach to science called practical realism. From the perspective of Vihalemm, science is not only theoretical but first and foremost a practical activity. This kind of approach puts chemistry rather than physics into the position of a typical science as chemistry has a dual character resting on both constructive-hypothetico-deductive and classifying-historico-descriptive types of cognition. Chemists deal with finding out the laws of nature like the physicists. However, in addition to this (...) they deal with substances or stuff that is rather an activity typical to natural history. The analysis of the dual character of chemistry brings about the need to analyse philosophically the reasons why physics has held the position of the only science proper so far. The comparative analysis of physics and chemistry at the basis of practical realism suggests that it is chemistry rather than physics that should hold a special position among sciences. Perhaps we should exchange ϕ-science for χ-science. (shrink)

Georges Frédéric Parrot (1767–1852), the first Rector of the University of Tartu (Dorpat) after it was reopened in 1802, was a son of the French Enlightenment. He considered it his mission to implement these ideas in the context of the new university. One of the foci of his activities was arranging the university according to a new type of statutes endorsing free development of all kinds of branches of science in the framework of the so-called ‘Academic Republic’, which would be (...) no longer dominated by theology. Parrot was successful in his pursuits. The University of Tartu became an outstanding centre of astronomy, mathematics and natural science—the fields Parrot himself was actively involved in. Today, the term Academic Republic is becoming more and more frequently used by the university employees again. The emphasis on the role of natural science, which was one of Parrot’s main ideas, caused the need for a New Enlightenment. This is the term invented by Nicholas Maxwell, the British philosopher of science. Although the focus of Maxwell’s New Enlightenment seems to be much narrower than that of the classical one, the final goal is still the same. According to Maxwell, making physics the science proper, the basis of constructing serious academic knowledge, has caused the concentration of research on the quest for some kind of special knowledge, the scientific one. Everything stops there. We have lost sight of the general goal of serving humanity, looking for solutions to actual grave problems that Homo sapiens is facing today. Obviously, to serve the whole humanity was the basic goal of the “original” Enlightenment as well. We have to restore the view of the so-called philosophes concerning the position of social science in the academia. It is social science (and the humanities) that form the basis for the understanding and solving the problems that are of real importance to human life. (shrink)

As an idealist, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz could not recognize anything corporeal as substantial. However, under the influence of Cartesian terminology, he devoted considerable effort to analysing the corporeal world, while not recognizing its real substantiality of course. Leibniz took the concept of substance from Plato, Aristotle and the scholastics, but developed it in two ways. It is a well-known fact that Leibniz introduced the term ‘corporeal substance’ in his letter to Antoine Arnauld dated to October 1687. In the letter, Leibniz (...) understands an object of nature, like an animal or a plant, as ‘corporeal substance’. In the very same letter, Leibniz introduces the terms ‘indivisibility’ and ‘phenomenon’. Every corporeal substance can be real only as a unity, i.e. by being indivisible. Such entity must have a soul or at least an entelechy. In an opposite case, that entity would not be a real unity but just a phenomenon. No corporeal entity is indivisible and therefore not a substance. The paper aims at introducing Leibniz’s distinction between substances and phenomena and taking a closer look at the historicalphilosophical influences Leibniz experienced while developing his views of the corporeal world. Aristotle and Descartes will receive most of the attention, of course, as the concepts of ‘entelechy’ and ‘hylomorphism’ were introduced by the former, and the understanding of corporeal substance as determined by extension alone is part of the latter. The core of the original critique by Leibniz takes off from the properties of the continuum as well as the nature of shape, motion and extension. The case of continuum will receive special attention. It is analysed with the help of the novel approaches by Samuel Levey and Vassil Vidinsky. Leibniz was critical about our poor understanding of the continuum but his own interpretation of it was not fully consistent either. Although the new developments enable us to take a fresh look that has not been possible so far, the issue remains open for further study. (shrink)

Philosophy has sometimes been considered to be the science of science. Analogously, it can perhaps be called inquiry of inquiry. Traditional modern science has been aimed at acquiring knowledge of truth. Thus, it can be called knowledge-inquiry. It can be debated, however, whether knowledge of truth is the ultimate goal we have to achieve in science. Perhaps solving the problems of living should be brought to the foreground rather than the problems of knowledge. In order to fulfil this task, we (...) have to exchange knowledge-inquiry for wisdom-inquiry as Nicholas Maxwell has suggested. The latter involves the quest for knowledge but adds its application to the picture. There has to be constant improvement of the aims of scientific research in order to reach for the problems of living. This can be achieved in the scope of a new Enlightenment. As the result, the position of social sciences and humanities will be turned into a fundamental one. The attempts to model these fields after physics have to be stopped. The main task of social sciences and humanities is decisively different from that of physics and all other natural sciences. A new methodology has to be invented for these intellectual fields. (shrink)

The article addresses the two sides of the work of Nicholas Maxwell – his criticism of science and his call to bring about a revolution in academia encouraging it to become much more effective in tackling the real problems humanity is facing. I would use: It focuses on the connection of these two aspects of Maxwell’s work and provides a critical analysis of Maxwell’s conceptual framework. It is argued here that the two sides of Maxwell’s whole conception are not necessarily (...) connected, and do not have to be. Academia can be more effectively organized even without a change in our understanding of science. Maxwell has argued that academia has to aim at making wisdom rather than knowledge its goal. The knowledge-inquiry framework that currently prevails should be exchanged for wisdom-inquiry. Maxwell has explained his understanding of wisdom in several publications, while not being fully consistent in his explanations of what wisdom-inquiry has to embrace. In addition, Maxwell’s original approach to rationality goes against traditional attitudes. Maxwell is definitely critical of the Enlightenment but his attitude to Romanticism remains unclear. Related to these, the article addresses the future tasks of universities. (shrink)

The typical way to express the aim of science is to connect it with knowledge pursuit. This aim has been so strongly felt that sometimes typical scientific research has been called knowledge-inquiry. There is nothing wrong with knowledge as such. Especially when we have the knowledge of the highest quality, the scientific one, in mind. Still, science today should aim higher, surpass knowledge as its final goal and reach for wisdom. This brings about the need to implement wisdom-inquiry instead of (...) knowledge-inquiry as Nicholas Maxwell has suggested. In order to succeed, the problems of living rather than the problems of knowledge have to be brought to the foreground. (shrink)

The article discusses the origins, formation, and development of the scientific school of chemical physics and nanotechnology in Kazakhstan. The authors describe the achievements of a scientific school that is on par with the best of its kind locally and globally, adding new competitive results of practical relevance to the economic development of the country. The article also highlights the special role of the outstanding scientist Zulkhair Aimukhametovich Mansurov in the development of the methodological foundations of the scientific school, the (...) targeted training of the scientific personnel in the priority areas of the development of Kazakhstani chemical physics, and the creation of nanoscale materials for multifunctional purposes. Also, the main principles of the philosophy of Mansurov’s scientific school are presented. (shrink)

Nonclarity around the understandingof the concept of chaos has caused someconfusion in the contemporary natural science.For instance, not making a clear distinctionbetween the deterministic and quantum chaos hasmade it impossible to evaluate the approach ofIlya Prigogine in an appropriate way. It isshown that Jean Bricmont has missed the targetin his critique of I. Prigogine's ideas, as thelatter has concentrated his interest on systemsconsisting of infinite (arbitrarily large)number of particles in incessant mutualimpact, the former on systems that have afinite (not necessarily (...) large, althoughsometimes very large) number of particles,which move freely of any mutual impact orparticipate only in transient interaction. Thedifference may sometimes be quite crucial. Itis also suggested that if we consider theirreversibility as the basic element ofdescription of physical world, the world oftrajectories and wave functions cannot beresearched apart from this real irreversibility. (shrink)