The Hell of Being Who One Ordinarily Is: Is it Possible to Construct Stable Phenomenological Traits of Mood Disorders?

Constructivist Foundations 16 (2):227-229 (2021)
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Abstract

Assuming that the only epistemically relevant experiential report is the one made in the present moment, it may be unclear how individuals ground their responses to stable-trait assessments. …

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