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The Zombies Among Us
Noûs 52 (1):216-226 (2016)
Abstract
Philosophers disagree about whether there could be “zombies”: beings physically identical to normal human people but lacking consciousness. Establishing their possibility would refute physicalism. But it is seldom noted that the popular “constitution view” of human people implies that our bodies actually are zombies. This would contradict several widely held views in the philosophy of mind.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
I Am Mine: From Phenomenology of Self-Awareness to Metaphysics of Selfhood.Janko Nešić - 2023 - Belgrade Philosophical Annual 36 (1):67-85.
Partial Twinning and the Boundaries of a Person.Eric T. Olson - 2023 - Belgrade Philosophical Annual 36 (1):7-24.
Our “Cognitive Limitations” and the Hard Problem of Consciousness.Andrew Stark - forthcoming - Journal of the American Philosophical Association:1-20.
References found in this work
The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory (2nd edition).David J. Chalmers - 1996 - Oxford University Press.
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis.Frank Jackson - 1998 - New York: Oxford University Press.
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