Abstract

This article considers questions of epistemology and ontology within the work of philosopher Richard Rorty from a hitherto unexplored perspective. In fact, it constitutes the present author’s attempt to come to terms with Rorty’s own brand of constructivism, termed “pragmatism”, by means of an integrational linguistic approach, as laid out by its founder Roy Harris. The paper aims at shedding light on how an integrational critique of Rortian constructivism differs epistemologically from a realist critique when it comes to the notions of what constitutes knowledge, reality and truth. What emerges from the present intellectual endeavour to align these two important thinkers is a very complex picture of two positions with strong affinities but also with different points of emphasis. In this respect, the present paper is also an attempt at placing Harrisian integrationism in its proper context within the History of Idea.