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Phenomenal Concepts
In Thinking About Consciousness. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK (2002)
Abstract
Explores the structure of phenomenal concepts. It examines how far they are expressed by everyday words, compares them to perceptual concepts, develops a quotational model of their workings, considers how far they give rise to incorrigible judgements, and discusses whether they violate Wittgenstein's “private language argument”.Author's Profile
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