An argument against Fregean that-clause semantics

Philosophical Studies 138 (3):335 - 347 (2008)
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Abstract

I develop a problem for the Fregean Reference Shift analysis of that-clause reference. The problem is discussed by Stephen Schiffer in his recent book The Things We Mean (2003). Either the defender of the Fregean Reference Shift analysis must count certain counterintuitive inferences as valid, or else he must reject a plausible Exportation rule. I consider several responses. I find that the best response relies on a Kaplan-inspired analysis of quantified belief reports. But I argue that this response faces some serious problems.

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Adam Pautz
Brown University

Citations of this work

Concept Designation.Arvid Båve - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (4):331-344.
Problems for Russellian Act-Type Theories.Arvid Båve - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
A note on pretense and co-reference.Michael Hicks - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (3):395 - 400.

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References found in this work

The things we mean.Stephen Schiffer - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Quantifiers and propositional attitudes.Willard van Orman Quine - 1955 - Journal of Philosophy 53 (5):177-187.
Quantifying in.David Kaplan - 1968 - Synthese 19 (1-2):178-214.
Thought without Representation.John Perry & Simon Blackburn - 1986 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 60 (1):137-166.

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