Dual Control and the Causal Theory of Action: The Case of Non-intentional Action

In Johannes Roessler & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. New York: Oxford University Press (2003)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 100,865

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

Intentional Action and Self-Awareness.Johannes Roessler - 2003 - In Johannes Roessler & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. New York: Oxford University Press.
The Development of Young Children's Action Control and Awareness.Douglas Frye & Philip David Zelazo - 2003 - In Johannes Roessler & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. New York: Oxford University Press.
The sense of agency: Awareness and ownership of action.Anthony J. Marcel - 2003 - In Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 48–93.
Agency and self-awareness: Mechanisms and epistemology.Naomi M. Eilan & Johannes Roessler - 2003 - In Johannes Roessler & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. New York: Oxford University Press.
Action: Awareness, ownership, and knowledge.Christopher Peacocke - 2003 - In Johannes Roessler & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. New York: Oxford University Press.
Action: Awareness, ownership, and knowledge.Christopher Peacocke - 2003 - In Johannes Roessler & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. New York: Oxford University Press.
The Tinkering Mind.Tillmann Vierkant - 2022 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Fractionating the intentional control of behaviour: A neuropsychological analysis.G. Humphreys & M. Jane Riddoch - 2003 - In Johannes Roessler & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 201--217.
Experimental Approaches to Action.Wolfgang Prinz - 2003 - In Johannes Roessler & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. New York: Oxford University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP
2014-04-03

Downloads
1 (#1,944,080)

6 months
1 (#1,886,877)

Historical graph of downloads

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Josef Perner
University of Salzburg

Citations of this work

Mindlessness.Ezio Di Nucci - 2013 - Cambridge Scholars Press.
Does bodily awareness interfere with highly skilled movement?Barbara Montero - 2010 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 53 (2):105 – 122.
Action, Deviance, and Guidance.Ezio Di Nucci - 2013 - Abstracta (2):41-59.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references