Proof, Reliability, and Mathematical Knowledge

Theoria 69 (3):211-232 (2003)
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Abstract

With respect to the confirmation of mathematical propositions, proof possesses an epistemological authority unmatched by other means of confirmation. This paper is an investigation into why this is the case. I make use of an analysis drawn from an early reliability perspective on knowledge to help make sense of mathematical proofs singular epistemological status.

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2008

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10.1111/j.1755-2567.2003.tb00763.x

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Anthony F. Peressini
Marquette University

Citations of this work

Why Is Proof the Only Way to Acquire Mathematical Knowledge?Marc Lange - 2024 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 102 (2):333-353.
Proofs, Reliable Processes, and Justification in Mathematics.Yacin Hamami - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 74 (4):1027-1045.
Statistical Data and Mathematical Propositions.Cory Juhl - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (1):100-115.

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References found in this work

Discrimination and perceptual knowledge.Alvin I. Goldman - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (November):771-791.
Seeing And Knowing.Fred I. Dretske - 1969 - Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.
A causal theory of knowing.Alvin I. Goldman - 1967 - Journal of Philosophy 64 (12):357-372.
Conclusive reasons.Fred I. Dretske - 1971 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):1-22.

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