Abstract

Several commentators, among them R. Rorty, argue that Cartesian ideas are to be understood as internal objects or pictures that are presented to the mind on an 'inner arena'. In this paper I intend to show that such an interpretation is flawed if one takes into account Descartes' definition of ideas as mental a c t s having a representational content. I analyze this definition, paying particular attention to three crucial theses: intentionality is an intrinsic feature of all mental acts; mental acts primarily represent the essence of an object, not the existing object; the object, insofar as it is presented to the mind, determines the socalled Objective reality' of an idea. I reach the conclusion that one ought to be careful in attributing a representational theory to Descartes. His theory may be called representational only if it is understood as a theory about representing mental acts that are immediately directed towards external objects