Abstract

In 1972 Hubert Dreyfus published an influential critique of artificial intelligence. I argue that the real target of this critique is the representational theory of intentionality, which holds that we are directed upon objects in virtue of representing them mentally. The negative side of the critique is the claim that this theory is inadequate. The positive side of the critique is the multiple intentionality thesis; the suggestion that there are more fundamental, non-representational forms of intentionality in which the representational form is grounded. I support the claim, first outlined by Dreyfus, that Husserl's noetic-noematic theory of acts of consciousness has deep affinities with the representational theory of mind, widely accepted in philosophy of mind, cognitive science and AI. The representational theory of intentionality is a corollary of this more general theory of mental functioning. I point out that Husserl's version of the theory is subject to a number of internal difficulties bearing a definite resemblance to some problems encountered in AI. Heidegger produced an alternative to the Husserlian account which distinguished several different forms of intentionality; chief among them the forms he called circumspection and thematization. Thematization corresponds to representational intentionality, and involves inner representations constituting an internal world model. In contrast, circumspection makes intentionality dependent not on internal mental content, but on the external context within which the organism is embedded. The notion of context may, then, be taken as fundamental to a non-representational theory of intentionality. I discuss some recent work in both AI and philosophy of mind which, in one way or another, recognizes the role of context. Two things emerge from this discussion. First, the inner representations eschewed by the non-representational theory of intentionality are primarily representations having a linguistic and logical structure. Second, there are different dimensions of context, among them the physical, the sociolinguistic, and the temporal. These three dimensions present distinct problems and opportunities for further development of the non-representational paradigm of intentionality.