Where Do We Go from Here? An Analysis and Critique of the Current Physicalist Theories of Mind

Quaerens Deum: The Liberty Undergraduate Journal for Philosophy of Religion 5 (1) (2020)
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Abstract

As naturalism continues to dominate academia it naturally flows into philosophy of mind. Physicalist theories of mind reduce the mind to only what is material. Philosophers like Jaegwon Kim and Daniel Dennett present forceful arguments against mental states of mind holding causal power at all. This paper will critique arguments from Kim and Dennett regarding physicalist theories of mind and show that the philosopher who does not hold to a naturalist worldview need not be frightened by arguments like Kim or Dennett's.

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What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (4):435-50.
What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: a guide and anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.
Psychologism and behaviorism.Ned Block - 1981 - Philosophical Review 90 (1):5-43.
Grounding mental causation.Thomas Kroedel & Moritz Schulz - 2016 - Synthese 193 (6):1909-1923.
Intentional Systems Theory.Daniel Dennett - 2007 - In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind. New York: Oxford University Press.

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