Abstract

In the first two chapters of Warrant and Proper Function, I presented my account of warrant; in the next seven chapters, I provide an explanation of how my account works in the main areas of our cognitive life. In this chapter, I begin this explanation by examining how warrant works with respect to self‐knowledge and memory. In the course of examining self‐knowledge and its relationship to warrant, I first argue against Derek Parfit's claim that we do not know and cannot justifiably believe that there is such a thing as a persisting subject of experience that is distinct from any of those experiences of which it is the subject. Second, I briefly argue that the beliefs that we are neither our brains nor our bodies are beliefs that have a good deal of warrant for us. Turning next to memory, I provide a brief discussion of the phenomenology of memory and argue that typical memory beliefs are basic and are capable of having a great deal of warrant for us.