A resource-bounded agent addresses the newcomb problem

Synthese 176 (1):57-82 (2010)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In the Newcomb problem, the standard arguments for taking either one box or both boxes adduce what seem to be relevant considerations, but they are not complete arguments, and attempts to complete the arguments rely upon incorrect principles of rational decision making. It is argued that by considering how the predictor is making his prediction, we can generate a more complete argument, and this in turn supports a form of causal decision theory

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

    This entry is not archived by us. If you are the author and have permission from the publisher, we recommend that you archive it. Many publishers automatically grant permission to authors to archive pre-prints. By uploading a copy of your work, you will enable us to better index it, making it easier to find.

    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 104,556

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

A Solution to the Predictor Paradox.Michael F. Stack - 1977 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7 (1):147 - 154.
Are Newcomb problems really decisions?James M. Joyce - 2006 - Synthese 156 (3):537-562.
Newcomb, frustrated.Rhys Borchert & Jack Spencer - 2023 - Analysis 84 (3):449-456.
The meta-newcomb problem.Nick Bostrom - 2001 - Analysis 61 (4):309–310.
The meta-Newcomb problem.Nick Bostrom - 2001 - Analysis 61 (4):309-310.
Causal Probability.John L. John L. - 2002 - Synthese 132 (1/2):143-185.
Causal probability.John L. Pollock - 2002 - Synthese 132 (1-2):143 - 185.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-02-26

Downloads
149 (#159,123)

6 months
16 (#193,509)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

John Pollock
University of Edinburgh

Citations of this work

Why Take Both Boxes?Jack Spencer & Ian Wells - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (1):27-48.
Causal decision theory.Paul Weirich - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Add more citations