Abstract

This work demonstrates how the question of persons and respect for persons assumes a categorization of persons as objects of a certain sort, and hence a categorization of what their relations, including that of respect, must be. These categories and concerns, I argue, stem from, leave intact, and tend to support social practices that reduce persons to abstractions. ;The essay begins within the philosophical tradition, at the level of ideas, in search of "origins," with an attempt to articulate the nature of respect for persons. The figures examined in subsequent chapters either participate in that search for foundational origins or are critical of that project . ;As evidenced by Kant and Heidegger, the philosophical enterprise to formulate adequate notions of persons and respect fails. Kant's notion of respect is compatible with his denial of a right to rebel ; Heidegger's concern is primarily with Being, persons defined only derivatively. That project can be addressed adequately only by examining its historical, material roots or beginnings. Marx's theory of historical materialism and Camus' theory of rebellion illustrate how adequate treatment of our questions requires that we uncover the concrete practices from which those questions and that project emerged. ;As we deal with Foucault's theory of sovereign power--and medicine as a disciplining mechanism that generates and perpetuates the need to define persons and respect--we begin the necessary geneology or search for beginnings. By analyzing practices that dialectically inform our philosophical debate, we find the source of our notions of respect and persons. ;Hence, "what are persons?" and "how do we respect others?" are complex questions that assume false dichotomies and material conditions which must first be addressed. Ultimately, I reject these issues as stated and indicate how to reformulate them