Intentionality and the Paradox of the Liar

Dissertation, Brown University (1980)
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Abstract

In my dissertation I develop a theory of intentionality in which our logical concepts--Negation, Conjunction, Disjunction, Conditionality, and Quantification--are extracted from the propositional objects of our thought, and are absorbed into our propositional attitudes. I then examine the implications which this intentional interpretation of our logical concepts has, for providing a solution to the various formulations of the Paradox of the Liar.

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