Abstract

The idea that Wittgenstein was part of the Aristotelian‐Thomist tradition may seem even more far‐fetched. Wittgenstein argued that we are suffering from a mythology about the nature of thought and meaning. In Action, Emotion and Will, under the influence of Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, and Wittgenstein, Anthony Kenny presented an anti‐causalist account of intentional action. Aquinas and Wittgenstein do not defend exactly the same doctrines about intentionality. But reading them in parallel enhances the understanding we can have of each of them, and assists us in understanding the issues they both raise. One side‐effect of Wittgenstein's liberation of philosophy from Cartesian prejudices is that it enables those who accept it to give a more sympathetic welcome to the writings of pre‐Cartesian philosophers, and in particular to medieval scholastics. Thinking of Aquinas and Wittgenstein as belonging to the same tradition radically challenges the understanding we have of both the Austro‐British philosopher and the Doctor Communis.