Two Essays on Temporal Realism'

In Brian Jack Copeland (ed.), Logic and reality: essays on the legacy of Arthur Prior. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 43 (1996)
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Citations of this work

A theory of presentism.Craig Bourne - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (1):1-23.
Realism About Tense and Perspective.Caspar Hare - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (9):760-769.
Presentism, Ontology and Temporal Experience.L. Nathan Oaklander - 2002 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 50:73-90.

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