Abstract

Is the imposition of criminal liability ever justified in cases of negligent conduct? On a subjectivist approach, which regards the culpability of the accused as a necessary condition of criminal liability, it would not be, since only subjective intent and foresight are considered morally culpable, and thus criminally liable. An objectivist approach, however, permits criminal liability for negligence, but rejects the fundamental importance assigned by subjectivists to moral culpability. It seems, then, that we must either dismiss the significance of moral culpability in assigning criminal liability or reject negligence as a basis for criminal liability. ;This dissertation rejects this putative dilemma. Negligence is a legitimate basis for imposing criminal liability because, in at least some defined circumstances, it is morally culpable. According to the character theory of responsibility which this dissertation defends, negligence is culpable because we are responsible, as moral agents, not only for our actions, but for our moral characters. Specifically, we are responsible for our moral view of the world and for any unreasonable and inadvertent actions that flow from a defect in our moral outlook , particularly in situations involving serious risks to fundamental rights and interests of other persons. In these situations, we have a criminal law duty to hold these fundamental rights and interests in proper moral regard so as to avoid inadvertently harming others