Inalienable rights: Recent criticism and old doctrine

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 29 (3):391-404 (1969)
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Abstract

Recent criticism of inalienable-Rights doctrine is shown to be based upon the erroneous assumption that, In calling certain rights inalienable, Eighteenth-Century constitution-Writers implied that they are unconditional. S.M. Brown, Jr., D.G. Ritchie, And e.F. Carritt all reject the doctrine because the exercise or enjoyment of these rights can sometimes be justifiably denied. Provisions of bills of rights and other writings are cited to establish that their authors did not consider these rights unlimited. What they meant in declaring them inalienable is that no man can voluntarily relinquish them. Consequently, The distinction frankena proposes is not needed to save traditional theory from the adverse verdict of its critics

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