Abstract

This thesis examines two conceptions of impartiality articulated within liberal political theory and their respective effects on the principles for the just distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation. One form is derived from the device of the impartial sympathetic spectator described by Adam Smith in The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Later, refined by Roderick Firth, the impartial spectator theory has come to be identified with utilitarianism. I refer to it as "utilitarian impartiality." This form requires that I imagine myself in the place of all persons affected by any proposed scheme of distribution. From the perspective of the impartial spectator, I am able to arrive at utilitarianism as the principle of just distribution and to decide on which of the possible schemes of distribution best meets the utilitarian criteria for just distribution. ;The second form is derived from a Kantian understanding of the noumenal moral self. This form has been most highly developed in Rawls' contract theory. I refer to it as "contractarian impartiality." This form requires that, using only my rational powers and desires, I decide on the principles of distribution in complete ignorance of who I am. From this perspective, I am able to arrive at two non-utilitarian principles for social distribution: the principle of equal liberty and the difference principle. Rawls claims that contractarian impartiality is superior to that of utilitarian impartiality. The thesis uses his claim as the focal point around which to organize an examination of both forms and the resulting principles of social distribution. ;The thesis contains an introduction and seven chapters covering: the differences between partiality and impartiality, the development of the device of the impartial sympathetic spectator, Rawls' construction of the original position as a model of contractarian impartiality, his critique of utilitarian impartiality, John Harsanyi's principle of average utilitarianism as a challenge to Rawls' conclusions, questioning the assumption of self-interestedness as a defensible place to begin contractarian theorizing, and rejecting Rawls' claim and questioning the appropriateness of "contractarian impartiality" and the difference principle for the distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation