Abstract

This study investigates the proper logical forms of theories of epistemic justification and defends the foundationalist theory by using the concept of epistemic supervenience. ;In chapters 1 and 2, I argue that due to the possibility of actual infinite regresses of justified beliefs, the traditional infinite regress argument for foundationalism is not eliminative enough to force us to adopt foundationalism and so we need more substantial solution to the regress problem to prevent the reemergence of total skepticism. ;In next two chapters, I argue that much needed argument can be found in the concept of epistemic supervenience and I apply this concept to the theory of epistemic justification. In chapter 3, I introduce the notion of epistemic supervenience and distinguish the partiresultance concept of epistemic supervenience from the standard current concept of it, represented by Jaegwon Kim. I argue that most contemporary theories of epistemic justification should be understood in terms of the former, not in terms of the latter. More importantly, an evidential support must go from the former to the latter, not the other way around. ;In chapter 4, I argue that my notion of epistemic supervenience can be used as an argument for two essential foundationalist theses. For, by the concept of epistemic supervenience, we can be assured of the existence of non-epistemic justification-making properties from which directly evident beliefs can be generated and we can be also assured of the existence of necessary relations which transmit this justification to other beliefs in one's doxastic system. Moreover, I have argued that two important corollaries can be drawn from epistemic supervenience: One is the proof showing that there cannot be an infinite regress which is inimical to foundationalism and so the total skepticism on this account should be abandoned. The other is that justification of epistemic beliefs must follow the logical pattern of what Roderick Chisholm calls "critical cognitivism". ;In the final chapter, I discuss and refute two possible objections against epistemic supervenience, by showing that these objections lead us to two implausible forms of global skepticism. Consequently, I conclude that both epistemic foundationalism and meta-epistemic foundationalism are the proper logical forms in the theory of epistemic justification