Aesthetic Autonomy and Self-Aggrandisement

Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 75:3-28 (2014)
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Abstract

You're not as clever as you think you are. Nor for that matter are you as good a driver, teacher or romantic partner as you take yourself to be and, as if that wasn't bad enough, you are also considerably less popular than you have hitherto believed. Finally – and crucially for the argument of this paper – I contend that your abilities as an aesthetic judge are considerably less impressive than you take them to be. To avoid descending into name calling it's worth pointing out that such claims apply to the vast majority of people – myself, somewhat paradoxically, included.

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Jon Robson
Nottingham University

Citations of this work

Higher-Order Evidence.Daniel Whiting - 2020 - Analysis 80 (4):789-807.
Speculative Aesthetic Expressivism.Neil Sinclair & Jon Robson - 2022 - British Journal of Aesthetics (2):181-197.
Higher-Order Evidence in Aesthetics.Daniel Whiting - 2023 - British Journal of Aesthetics 63 (2):143-155.
Aesthetic Judgments, Evaluative Content, and (Hybrid) Expressivism.Jochen Briesen - 2024 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 11.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Epistemology of disagreement: The good news.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
Reflection and disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.
Categories of Art.Kendall L. Walton - 1970 - Philosophical Review 79 (3):334-367.
Experts: Which ones should you trust?Alvin I. Goldman - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):85-110.
The epistemic significance of disagreement.Thomas Kelly - 2005 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 1. Oxford University Press UK. pp. 167-196.

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