capabilitarianism

Journal of Human Development and Capabilities (forthcoming)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper offers a critique of Martha Nussbaum’s description of the capability approach, and offers an alternative. I will argue that Nussbaum’s characterization of the capability approach is flawed, in two ways. First, she unduly limits the capability to two strands of work, thereby ignoring important other capabilitarian scholarship. Second, she argues that there are five essential elements that all capability theories meet; yet upon closer analysis three of them are not really essential to the capability approach. I also offer an alternative description of the capability approach, which is called the cartwheel view of the capability approach. This view is at the same time radically multidisciplinary yet also contains a foundationally robust core among its various usages, and is therefore much better able to make the case that the capability approach can be developed in a very wide range of more specific normative theories. Finally, the cartwheel view is used to argue against Nussbaum's claim that all capabilitarian political theory needs to be politically liberal.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-08-10

Downloads
689 (#39,809)

6 months
106 (#58,540)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Ingrid Robeyns
Utrecht University

References found in this work

What is the point of equality.Elizabeth Anderson - 1999 - Ethics 109 (2):287-337.
Perfectionist Liberalism and Political Liberalism.Martha C. Nussbaum - 2011 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 39 (1):3-45.
Perfectionism and politics.Richard J. Arneson - 2000 - Ethics 111 (1):37-63.
Is the capability approach paternalist?Ian Carter - 2014 - Economics and Philosophy 30 (1):75-98.

View all 9 references / Add more references