Abstract

This article explores Schelling's critique of Fichte's idealism in light of his evolving metaphysical framework, emphasizing his affirmation of the primacy of nature. By challenging Fichte's concept of being, Schelling underscores the importance of a realist position that asserts the unity of ideal and real, drawing on Hölderlin’s idea of Being as trans-reflexive. The first major theme examined is Schelling’s critique of the distinction between consciousness and its real content, which Fichte's system inadvertently promotes. Schelling counters this by advocating for an identity of the ideal and the real, thus reframing the metaphysical debate. The second theme explores the theory of the bond, a pivotal shift in Schelling’s thought, which disrupts the notion of a systematic unity grounded in reason. Schelling’s realization that no being can wholly be itself, and the resulting impossibility of establishing a strict identity, challenges the traditional modern philosophical systems that uphold the identity of principle and development. This article argues that Schelling’s work anticipates a more dynamic, interconnected understanding of Being, ultimately undermining the conventional idea of reason as a static, substantial principle, as upheld by earlier idealist thinkers.