Agents' knowledge

In Timothy O'Connor & Constantine Sandis (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Action. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 236–243 (2010)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This chapter contains sections titled: References.

Categories

Keywords

agents' knowledge   common sense and philosophical tradition, agents enjoying a distinctive kind of knowledge of their own intentional actions   patient's ‘sense of agency’ – impaired, experiencing his actions as not (fully) his own   Kant and Anscombe, that agents' awareness of their actions ‐ is in some sense constitutive of rational or intentional agency   issue of epistemic justification   empiricist approach, strongly discouraged by Anscombe ‐ as fantasy of a “very queer and special sort of seeing eye in the middle of acting”   expressing agents' knowledge by expressing intentions   Moran's neo‐Kantian proposal ‐ deliberating under idea of deliberation being efficacious   defective sub‐personal monitoring ‐ loss of experience of agency, lack of first‐person knowledge of agency

Reprint years

ISBN(s)

9781444323528   9781405187350

DOI

10.1002/9781444323528.ch30

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,297

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

Stipulative Agency.Derek Lam - 2021 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 7. Oxford University Press. pp. 7-31.
Agents, knowledge and backwards causation.Brian Garrett - 2017 - Analysis 77 (1):37-43.
First-personal aspects of agency.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2011 - Metaphilosophy 42 (1-2):1-16.
Interpreting Anscombe’s Intention §32FF.Anne Newstead - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Research 34:157-176.
Anscombe and Practical Knowledge of What Is Happening.Thor Grünbaum - 2009 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 78 (1):41-67.
Rational Agency without Self‐Knowledge: Could ‘We’ Replace ‘I’?Luke Roelofs - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (1):3-33.
Perception and Practical Knowledge.John Schwenkler - 2011 - Philosophical Explorations 14 (2):137-152.
Agency.P. M. S. Hacker - 2007 - In Human Nature: The Categorial Framework. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 122–160.

Analytics

Added to PP
2012-01-20

Downloads
76 (#277,319)

6 months
4 (#1,263,115)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Johannes Roessler
University of Warwick

Citations of this work

Non‐Observational Knowledge of Action.John Schwenkler - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (10):731-740.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references