Multisensory Perception in Philosophy

Multisensory Research 34 (3):219-231 (2021)
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Abstract

This is the editors' Introduction to a special issue of the journal, Multisensory Research. European philosophers of the modern period found multisensory perception to be impossible because they thought that perceptual ideas are defined by how they are experienced. Under this conception, the individual modalities are determinables of ideas—just as colour is a determinable that embraces red and blue, so also the visual is a determinable that embraces colour and (visually experienced) shape. Since no idea is experienced as, for example, both visual and auditory, there can be no such thing as audiovisual perception. This conception of modality is not directly contested, but a variety of perceptual phenomena are listed that could raise interesting questions if treated as multimodal in origin.

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Author Profiles

Mohan Matthen
University of Toronto, Mississauga
Amber Ross
University of Florida

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References found in this work

Aristotle on the common sense.Pavel Gregoric - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Some remarks about the senses.H. P. Grice - 1962 - In R. J. Butler (ed.), Analytical Philosophy, First Series. Oxford University Press.
Is Consciousnes Multisensory?Tim Bayne & Charles Spence - 2014 - In Dustin Stokes, Mohan Matthen & Stephen Biggs (eds.), Perception and Its Modalities. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 95-132.

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