Cohesive proportionality

Philosophical Studies 181 (1):179-203 (2024)
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Abstract

Proportionality—the idea that causes are neither too general nor too specific for their effects—seems to recommend implausibly disjunctive causes (McGrath, 1998 ; Shapiro & Sober, 2012 ; Franklin-Hall, 2016 ). I argue that this problem should be avoided by appeal to the notion of cohesion. I propose an account of cohesion in terms of the similarity structure of property-spaces, argue that it is not objectionably mysterious, and that alternative approaches—based on naturalness, interventionism, and contrastivism—are inadequate without appeal to it. In an appendix, I show how my proposal can be perspicuously formalized by adapting structural equation models.

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Ezra Rubenstein
University of California, Berkeley

Citations of this work

Thing causation.Nathaniel Baron-Schmitt - 2024 - Noûs 58 (4):1050-1072.
Proportionality in Causation, Part I: Theories.Ezra Rubenstein - 2024 - Philosophy Compass 19 (1):e12957.
List and Menzies on High‐Level Causation.Jens Jager - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 102 (4):570-591.

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References found in this work

Writing the Book of the World.Theodore Sider - 2011 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Depth: An Account of Scientific Explanation.Michael Strevens - 2008 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.
Mental causation.Stephen Yablo - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):245-280.
Contrastive causation.Jonathan Schaffer - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (3):327-358.

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