Is artefactualness a value-relevant property of living things?

Synthese 185 (1):89-102 (2012)
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Abstract

Artefacts are often regarded as being mere things that possess only instrumental value. In contrast, living entities (or some subset of them) are often regarded as possessing some form of intrinsic (or non-instrumental) value. Moreover, in some cases they are thought to possess such value precisely because they are natural (i.e., non-artefactual). However, living artefacts are certainly possible, and they may soon be actual. It is therefore necessary to consider whether such entities should be regarded as mere things (like most non-living artefacts) or as possessing intrinsic value (like many, if not all) living entities. That is, it is necessary to determine whether artefactualness is a value-relevant property with respect to the intrinsic value of living things.

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Ronald Sandler
Northeastern University

Citations of this work

A Framework for Grounding the Moral Status of Intelligent Machines.Michael Scheessele - 2018 - AIES '18, February 2–3, 2018, New Orleans, LA, USA.
Nature's Intrinsic Value.Benjamin Steyn - 2024 - Environmental Ethics 46 (2):107-130.

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References found in this work

Groundwork for the metaphysics of morals.Immanuel Kant - 1785 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Thomas E. Hill & Arnulf Zweig.
Animal Liberation.Peter Singer (ed.) - 1977 - Avon Books.
Utilitarianism.John Stuart Mill - 1861 - Cleveland: Oxford University Press UK. Edited by Roger Crisp.

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