What is a second order theory committed to?

Erkenntnis 20 (1):79 - 91 (1983)
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Abstract

The paper argues that no second order theory is ontologically commited to anything beyond what its individual variables range over.

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Charles Sayward
University of Nebraska, Lincoln

Citations of this work

Quantifying over the reals.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1994 - Synthese 101 (1):53 - 64.

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References found in this work

Two Dogmas of Empiricism.W. Quine - 1951 - [Longmans, Green].
Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Willard V. O. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.
New work for a theory of universals.David K. Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.
Ways of worldmaking.Nelson Goodman - 1978 - Hassocks [Eng.]: Harvester Press.

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