Abstract

For over two hundred years, the dominant systematic theory among moral, political, and legal philosophers in the English-speaking world has been some form of utilitarianism. This theory purports to promote "the greatest happiness for the greatest number" by making this consideration paramount for normative questions. More recently, utilitarianism's dominance has been challenged. Many philosophers used the criticisms and objections that have accumulated over the years to launch their consideration of alternative normative positions. Still other philosophers have reexamined utilitarianism in the hope of repairing the damage pointed out by the critics. Arguably, one of the more successful attempts to support utilitarianism is also one of the more extensive renovations of it. This is found in the work of R. M. Hare. ;This dissertation presents some of the more common and telling objections to utilitarianism. Also, it presents R. M. Hare's reformulation of the utilitarian position. These are followed by the relative merits of each. It will be admitted that the objections rightly pointed to failings of earlier, less sophisticated versions of the theory. However, it will also be argued that Hare's reformulation succeeds in handling many of the standard procedural and normative objections. Hare accomplishes this by arguing from his analysis of the logic of our moral language to his utilitarianism, by re-defining utility, and by restricting the role of traditional utilitarian considerations in our moral thinking. While Hare has not responded to each point of every objection, responses are undertaken from the Reformulated Utilitarian perspective. Hare's degree of success is attributed to the combination of his careful analysis and his synthetic blend of points from a variety of traditions and philosophers