Breaking the Fourth Wall and (Meta)Fictional Reference

British Journal of Aesthetics 64 (4):647-668 (2024)
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Abstract

I investigate statements in fiction that ‘break the fourth wall’ (i.e. statements through which a fictional character somehow acknowledges the fictionality of their world) and suggest that they are a mirror image of ‘parafictional statements’—that is, reports on what is true in some fiction. I explore two possible analyses, according to which statements that break the fourth wall are either a type of fictional statement, or are a type of metafictional statement, and propose a synthesis of these two analyses. I discuss how the proposed analysis relates to different interpretative strategies for dealing with inconsistency in fiction and discuss several potential counterexamples to the proposed analysis.

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Merel Semeijn
Institut Jean Nicod

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Truth in fiction.David K. Lewis - 1978 - American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (1):37–46.
Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts.Kendall L. Walton - 1990 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 49 (2):161-166.
Creatures of Fiction.Peter van Inwagen - 1977 - American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (4):299 - 308.
The Logical Status of Fictional Discourse.John R. Searle - 1975 - New Literary History 6 (2):319--32.
Vacuous names and fictional entities.Saul A. Kripke - 2011 - HORIZON. Studies in Phenomenology 8 (2):676-706.

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